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Abstract

More than 30 years after Latin America transitioned from dictatorships to democracy, decentralization, and
institutional reforms to give impetus to citizen participation, transparency, government accountability and
good governance, expectations have disappointed and concerns are raised today over a slowdown, or even
reversal. Guest editor Cristina A. Rodríguez-Acosta, Assistant Director of FIU's renowned Institute for Public
Management and Community Service, invites leading experts to analyze where the region stands and how
decentralization reforms can be deepened.
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E d i t o r

Dear Hemisphere readers:
The Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center is pleased to be partnering with Florida International
University’s Institute for Public Management and Community Service (IPMCS) to provide our readers with an indepth look at the results of 30 years of reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Research on democratic transition and the challenges of its consolidation in Latin America and the Caribbean
is vast, but an area that has not received the attention it merits is the process of subnational decentralization and
economic development. The first generation of democratic reforms focused on institutional design and elections but
did not address the structural impediments to consolidation, many of which persist at the local level. Proponents
believed decentralization would help consolidate democratic rule by devolving power and authority from corrupt
and inefficient central governments. Despite some good outcomes, issues of transparency, economic development
and institutional capacity remain unresolved. More academic and policy work is required to help understand and
address the key gaps.
This issue of Hemisphere serves as a platform for discussion of this important topic. IPMCS, one of the leading
centers in the US for the study of local governance in Latin America and the Caribbean, has collected an impressive
group of scholars and practitioners from the region to analyze the unfinished business of consolidating effective,
transparent local government institutions and regulatory processes.
Special thanks to Cristina Rodríguez-Acosta, Assistant Director of IPMCS, for serving as guest editor. Her depth
of knowledge of the topic and network of experts and contacts in the field of local governance have been invaluable
in editing this issue. I am grateful to her and the contributors for their participation in this issue of Hemisphere and
for their commitment to where governance matters most – at the subnational level.
Frank O. Mora
Director
Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
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From the Guest Editor
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw Latin America’s transition from dictatorial regimes to democracy and with it, a
clear impetus for promoting citizen participation, transparency, greater accountability and good governance in most
countries. Many of these countries enacted new political constitutions and economic reforms to try to modernize
stagnant economies and promote social inclusion and economic development. Their administrations saw political, fiscal
and administrative reforms as essential to improving public service delivery and making governments more accountable
to their people.
More than 30 years later, many scholars, politicians and citizens worry that decentralization has not brought the
improvements it promised, and concerns are growing about a possible slowdown – if not a reversal – of the process. In
this Hemisphere issue, the Institute for Public Management and Community Service at Florida International University
has asked a wide range of observers to provide brief analyses of where we are now and how decentralization reforms can
be deepened.
In our main article, Professor Allan Rosenbaum notes that many forces are behind the decentralization process,
including the belief that strong local governments have the capacity to influence local, regional and national economic
development. Citing the United States’ experience with decentralization, Rosenbaum explores the ability of local
governments to be a source of innovation and economic development and offers six recommendations for building
effective administrations.
Marcelo Giugale, Senior Director at the World Bank Global Practice for Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management,
poses the question everybody has on their minds after 30 years of decentralization policies around the world and, in
particular, Latin America: Has it worked? How can we know? What evidence do we have? The results, he argues, are
mixed, but successful cases share elements in common: innovation, technology and low debt.
My own contribution is an overview of some of the political, fiscal and administrative reforms in the region, noting
the fragmentation of policy implementation in many countries as well as the fiscal disparities and overreliance of
subnational governments on fiscal transfers from the central government. Lack of revenue autonomy is accompanied
by insufficient expenditure autonomy at the subnational level. After three decades of reforms, the impetus toward
decentralization seems to be losing steam.
The importance of cultural values and historical traditions to citizen participation and the pace of decentralization
is addressed by Víctor J. Flecha, the head of a prominent Paraguayan NGO who has worked on issues related to
decentralization in several Latin American countries. Flecha also notes the sluggish adoption and implementation of
decentralization policies.
A series of articles on the decentralization experiences of several countries in the Americas further develop these
general arguments. Ilyana Albarrán argues that while Mexico’s decentralization has resulted in more decision-making
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authority at the local level and increased participation by allowing communities to manage projects, many problems
remain (e.g., inequality, corruption, collusion with drug cartels). These problems call into question the ability of
decentralization to bring about less corrupt and more accountable governments.
In another article on Mexico, Heidi Smith reviews the administrative structure of municipal debt in that country, its
implications for local economies, and the reasons why municipalities in Mexico acquire debt. Her discussion includes
examples and alternatives for public officials to make levels of subnational debt more sustainable.
Pablo Sanabria, analyzing decentralization in Colombia, explores aspects of intergovernmental relations and
fund transfers. In addition to a review of the challenges decentralization has brought with it, he ends by offering a
compelling agenda in which strengthening human capital at the local level is one of the key elements.
Gretha Burchard, for her part, provides an overview of Brazil’s cyclical relationship between centralization and
decentralization, reviewing reforms in specific sectors such as health, education and social welfare.
The successes and challenges of decentralization in Chile are the subject of the article by José Inostroza Lara and
Javier Fuenzalida Aguirre. Chile’s new president faces a series of challenges to deepen and strengthen the reforms
proposed by the Presidential Commission on Decentralization.
Finally, Professor Daniel Cravacuore of the National University of Quilmes, Argentina writes about the dangers of
recentralization and the need for all stakeholders to defend decentralization at the risk of becoming irrelevant.
In presenting these articles for consideration and debate, FIU’s Institute for Public Management and Community
Service is proud to contribute to the continuing discussion of the legacy and the future of decentralization in Latin
America.

Cristina A. Rodríguez-Acosta
Assistant Director
Institute for Public Management and
Community Service
Florida International University
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Local Government as a Source of Political and Economic Development:

What Can We Learn from Past Experience
in Latin America and Elsewhere?
By Allan Rosenbaum

T

he past half-century
has witnessed
numerous attempts
to build more
democratic and
prosperous societies through
governmental and economic
reform. In some parts of the
world, these efforts have been
transformative, with governments
moving from authoritarian, oneparty states to relatively pluralistic,
democratic ones. A number of
countries have also been the
scenes of dramatic and, in some
cases, successful economic reform.
Underlying many of the political
and economic reforms that have
captured headlines around the
world has been a widespread
movement toward decentralization
and the strengthening of local
government.
Many forces have driven this
movement, ranging from local
demands for more responsive,
participatory and democratic
grassroots governance to the
efforts of major international
organizations and national
aid agencies to encourage the
strengthening of local government
as a means to institutionalize more
democratic practices in countries
undergoing political and economic
transformation. More recently,

these efforts have been guided by
a growing belief that strong local
government has the capacity to
be an important factor in local,
regional and national economic
development. Nowhere has this
concern for decentralization and the
strengthening of local government
been more at the center of reform
efforts than in Latin America.
Such initiatives have not been
confined to Latin America, of course,
nor are they limited to the past few
decades. Arguably, the first real effort
to implement decentralization as a
means to facilitate both democratic
and economic development began
with the creation of the United States
nearly 250 years ago. Since that
time, many countries have sought to
institutionalize decentralized systems
of government and create local
governmental capacity to encourage
economic and political development.
A brief review of some of this
experience, both in Latin America
and elsewhere, provides useful
insights for better understanding
what will and won’t work and why,
as well as the likely consequences of
particular reform strategies.
Local government:
the US experience
The United States, in all
probability, possesses the most

highly developed subnational/
local government system of any
country in the world. In addition
to its 50 state governments, the
US has approximately 89,000 local
governments. About 38,000 of these
are general, or multi-purpose, city,
county and township governments,
and 51,000 are special, often singlepurpose, local governments. All are
independent, have taxing authority
and, in many cases, a considerable
degree of autonomy within the
geographic sphere in which they
operate. In terms of function,
the 51,000 special-purpose local
governments engage in activities
as diverse as controlling and/or
eradicating mosquitos, providing
public education to the nation’s
children, or wide ranging and
significant urban planning and/or
transportation initiatives. Often,
local governments have overlapping
jurisdictions, several of which can
impact citizens at once.
In certain respects, the high level
of governmental decentralization
in the United States is a direct
result of the circumstances under
which the country was established:
rebellion against a centralized and
authoritarian system in England
by 13 relatively independent and
separate colonies which, in some
cases, had very different economic
Hemisphere Volume 24
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bases and, in many instances,
did not really trust each other.
Consequently, the constitution
drafted by the country’s founders
gave great discretion to what were
to become the initial 13 states and
sought to limit the power of the
national government. The new
constitution mentioned nothing
about municipal government,
leaving it to the states to address that
matter. In the 200-plus years since
the founding of the US, individual
states have approached the issue of
local government in different ways.
Nevertheless, local government in
the United States has flourished and
continues to exercise great influence
over public service delivery.
One gets an especially good
sense of the significance of local
government in the US system
by putting it in comparative
perspective. Africa, for example, has
about 15,000 local governments.
Without counting the informal
village councils found in China,
Pakistan and India, Asia has about
26,000 local governments, and
Latin America 17,000. This adds
up to a total of approximately
58,000 local governments in
Latin America, Asia and Africa
combined, as opposed to 89,000
in the US. Moreover, subnational
governments in the US – state and
local – historically have served as the
source of much policy and political
innovation for the nation as a whole.
The ability of local governments
to be a source of policy innovation
and economic development is
based upon two factors: first, the
wide-ranging power and authority
given to US local governments and,
second, their equally wide-ranging
ability to levy taxes and assess fees
and charges. Virtually all US local
8

governments have considerable
capacity to impose property taxes.
Many also have the authority to
impose sales taxes and, in some
instances, even income taxes. This
authority comes from their state
governments, which also give most
local governments in the United
States substantial leeway to impose
charges and fees on everything from
collecting garbage to operating
parks and issuing licenses. In 2010,
for example, US local governments
collected more than $1.4 trillion
in general revenue: $430 billion
in property taxes, $323 billion in
charges and fees, $140 billion in
sales taxes and other revenues, and
$544 billion in intergovernmental
transfers from state and national
governments.
One consequence of the
substantial revenue raised at the
local level is that US state and
local govenments, when taken
together, are many times larger
than the national government. For
the past 65 years, the US national
government has operated with
about 2 million civilian employees.
Another half million Americans are
employed by the US Postal Service
and another million and a half by
the nation’s military and security
services. In contrast, state and local
governments employ between 15
and 19 million people.
The sheer number of individuals
involved in local government is
an important factor in dispersing
political power in the US. Almost
all local governments elect between
five and 15 executive officers and/
or councilpeople, and some as many
as 50 or 60. Moreover, in addition
to the large number of individuals
elected to local government offices,
many others hold appointed

positions designed to engage
citizenry in local government
activities. Virtually every US local
government appoints citizens to
various boards and committees. In
the case of large local governments,
anywhere from 200 to 1,000
individuals might serve on locally
appointed citizen bodies which, in
some cases, have decision-making
authority regarding the expenditure
of hundreds of millions of dollars.
One area of policy activity in
which US local governments are
especially likely to draw upon citizen
boards is the field of economic
development, often through
partnerships with prominent local
business leaders. In some cases,
the focus is on finding jobs for the
unemployed and underemployed;
in others, it is to encourage and
support the creation of new
businesses and economic enterprises.
In yet other instances, the purpose
is to lure business and industry from
other cities, states and countries.
Frequently, these efforts receive
significant financial support from
local and/or state governments.
In many cases, the goal is small
business development, which, in
recent decades, has become the
leading source of new jobs in the US
economy.
The rest of the world
One important reason for the
movement toward decentralization
has been general disillusionment
with centralized governments and
economic systems. The collapse
of the Soviet Union gave further
impetus to this development,
but decentralization was already
contributing to reshape Latin
America. In the 1960s, most
countries in the region were
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governed by authoritarian
and, often, highly centralized
dictatorships, both military and
civilian. Many of these dictatorships
began to collapse due to their
own economic inefficiency and
authoritarianism in the late 1970s
and 80s. That trend gave rise to
growing opposition to centralized
governments from within
individual countries and among the
international community.
The dispersal of political power
and the emergence of pluralist
political systems and civil society
have been among the main concerns
of the decentralization movement
of the past four decades. This
movement has succeeded in many
important ways. Just 40 years
ago, for example, less than 10 of
the world’s 45 largest countries
had elected local government
officials. Today, almost all of them
do. In Latin America, only three
governments had elected local
officials 30 years ago. Today, they are
the rule everywhere except Cuba.
Many countries have even initiated
regional governments, often elected,
where not so long ago few or none
existed.
Nevertheless, there are still parts
of the world where the movement
toward decentralization and local
government has not had a big
impact. Particularly notable in this
regard are the Middle East and
Central Asia, where, despite some
decentralization initiatives, the
kind of significant developments
that have occurred in other parts of
the world have yet to emerge. Some
countries have also taken a step
back from both decentralization
and democratization. Russia
especially stands out for the retreat
from decentralization under Putin’s

leadership. But Russia is not alone
in this regard; Colombia, once the
leader of the decentralization effort
in Latin America, has witnessed
significant efforts during the past
decade to recentralize governmental
authority and power. South Africa
too made significant progress
toward decentralization under its
first post-apartheid governments,
only to see recentralization creep
back in recent years.
The case for local government
The question of why major
decentralization initiatives have
occurred in many parts of the world
during the past several decades
can be answered in many ways.
Certainly, one important reason
is a desire for greater grassroots
democracy and citizen participation.
The drive to improve service delivery
has also been an important driving
force and, more recently, attention
has been directed at the possible
role of decentralization in reducing
inequality. Another explanation
for encouraging decentralization
has to do with its potentially
significant role in more general
efforts to promote local economic
development.
In terms of promoting democracy
and citizen participation,
institutional efforts go beyond
the election of local officials and
include participatory budgeting,
greater public involvement in
strategic planning activities, and
the establishment of local open
records laws. In much of Latin
America, cities have experimented
with decentralization in an effort to
enhance citizen participation. One
obstacle has been the fact that, in
many instances, the emerging local
governments have very little control

over or capacity to raise revenue.
One dramatic exception to this
Latin American pattern is Bolivia,
which has been extremely successful
in its attempts at decentralization,
in part because significant revenue
decentralization has accompanied
political decentralization. For
hundreds of years, a relatively
small elite of European origin
monopolized the nation’s political
and economic power, land and
wealth, marginalizing the majority
indigenous population through
policies that denied it fundamental
human and political rights. In
1994, under a relatively conservative
government, Bolivia enacted a
Popular Participation Law that
did two important things: First,
it established many new local
governments in areas where none
had existed and, equally important,
it provided local governments with
substantial financial resources,
earmarking 20% of the national
budget for this purpose. Second,
and equally significant, it created
strong institutional mechanisms
to ensure the participation of the
country’s indigenous population in
local government. This legislation,
which played a major role in
strengthening local government
in Bolivia, has helped encourage
dramatic political transformation
over the past quarter century.
Similar, if less dramatic,
situations have occurred in other
Latin American countries. In
numerous instances, emerging local
governments have served as the
vehicles through which opposition
political parties have organized
and begun to compete seriously
for national leadership, changing
the basic dynamic of the political
situation in numerous countries.
Hemisphere Volume 24
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Enrique Peña Nieto gives his speech during the First Citizen Summit organized by civil society in Mexico City on May 22, 2012. More than 300 organizations
participated in the summit, which presented a list of proposals to the country’s presidential candidates. ALFREDO ESTRELLA/AFP/Getty Images.

The local government movement
has provided opportunities for
many new organizations to develop,
especially NGOs, with profound
consequences for democratic
development. A case in point
is Chile, where internationally
supported local governance
initiatives facilitated the emergence
of Chilean civil society and
significantly hastened the end of the
Pinochet dictatorship.
The second major issue driving
the decentralization movement
is the question of public service
delivery. The results of such efforts
appear to be mixed. Some analysts
10

– Shah, Thompson and Zou
included – make a strong argument
that decentralization has improved
public service delivery. Others note
that political decentralization (in
the sense of local elections and
civil society mobilization) has not
always implied adequate financial
capacity. Moreover, in most cases
where substantial financial resources
have been made available to local
governments, they frequently
take the form of transfer funds
from national governments. Local
governments often have only very
limited control and discretion
over the use of these funds and,

in more than a few cases, national
governments habitually ignore
legislation requiring them to transfer
funds to local governments.
Especially in Western
democracies, where local
governments have a strong record
of success, such governments have
had a great deal of autonomy in
levying and raising taxes, issuing
bonds for capital construction,
imposing fees for services, and other
activities central to their ability to
deliver services effectively. In those
cases where it appears that the
quality of services has declined with
decentralization, it is often because
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of decreased national government
allocations to the local governments
with the responsibility for delivering
the service involved.
Reducing inequality has
been another growing focus of
decentralization efforts, especially
over the past decade. Results in
this area, too, have been mixed.
Some countries – Brazil, China
and Poland among them – have
focused on both encouraging
governmental decentralization
and raising the basic income of
their citizenry. Other countries,
including Chile, have attempted to
improve the quality of education
while encouraging political
decentralization. It is not clear
that such initiatives have produced
any significant movement toward
reducing income or wealth
inequality. In fact, some of the
same countries – Brazil and Chile
– have made significant reductions
in poverty but seen inequality grow.
The same phenomenon has been
true in China, where the emergence
of decentralized government
(if not decentralized political
power and control) over the past
three or four decades has helped
produce extraordinary economic
development while exacerbating
inequality. Thus, as large urban
populations have become wealthy,
the income and wealth gap between
them and rural areas of the country
has grown significantly.
The fourth point, the relationship
between decentralization and
economic development, is one that
has not been adequately explored
and, consequently, is often not well
understood. Although research on
the subject has produced mixed
results, it may well be the major
benefit of the decentralization

movement. Some quantitative
analyses using World Bank and
other data conclude that increasing
emphasis on local government
and decentralization produces
positive economic results, but
other researchers point to similar
studies that conclude the opposite.
One basic reality holds true
regarding the relationship between
decentralization and economic
development: the wealthier the
region of the world, the greater
the reliance upon subnational and
local governments for delivery of
important public services.
When taken together as a
group, wealthy countries devote
significant resources to subnational
government as a proportion
of government expenditures
and public employees. The
differences between rich and
poor countries are dramatic in
this regard, with the percentage
of all public expenditures and
public employment found at the
subnational level ranging from
40%-60% in the world’s wealthiest
countries to 10% in the poorest
ones. In the US, Canada, Western
Europe and Japan, the majority
of all public expenditures and
public employees are found at the
subnational level of government.
The general pattern is reflected in
the East Asian countries (China,
South Korea, Malaysia, etc.),
which have the next highest levels
of economic development and the
second greatest commitment to
subnational government in terms
of proportion of government staff
and funding. In Latin America,
about 20% of both government
employees and expenditures are
at the subnational level. Among
African countries, generally the

world’s least developed, the figure
is 10%.
China illustrates this point in
a dramatic way. Beginning in the
early 1970s and extending into the
1980s, China made major efforts to
decentralize government authority
and national economic resources.
One result of this is that in China
today, 80% of all state-owned
industries are, in fact, owned by local
governments and not by the national
government. The local authorities
have enabled and supported the
capacity of those industries for
economic development, leading to a
great flourishing of China’s economy.
Whatever China’s limitations in the
area of democratic development,
the past three decades of the
decentralization of governmental (if
not political) authority have produced
extraordinary economic results.
The underlying reason for this is
relatively simple: Local economic
development requires local
capacity to support and sustain
it. An important prerequisite
for an effective private sector is,
inevitably, an effective public
sector. It is the public sector that
provides the infrastructure and
the critical resources necessary
to support local economic
development activities: adequate
transportation facilities, water and
electricity, a competent workforce,
and a supportive legal framework
(including everything from
building and zoning requirements
to local business regulatory
policy). These are all matters that
are most effectively dealt with, and
most appropriately shaped and
managed, at the local level. To do
so effectively, however, requires
significant local capacity in terms
Hemisphere Volume 24
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Conference participants from Ecuador and Colombia during a networking session at Florida International University’s XX Inter-American Conference of
Mayors: “Building Sustainable, Equitable and Smart Cities: New Challenges for Latin America” held at the Hilton Miami Downtown Hotel from June
9-12, 2014. FELIPE SOTO.
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of authority and autonomy,
trained personnel and adequate
fiscal resources.
Six recommendations for building
effective local government
As noted at the outset, efforts to
build and strengthen democratic
local governance have been under
way for some time in many
countries. An increasing body of
knowledge exists about this topic,
with the most important lessons
learned including the following:
1) Accountability and
transparency are essential for
citizen confidence
Throughout the world, citizens
are increasingly demanding
accountability and transparency
from their governments. This is
especially true at the local level,
where confidence in government
is directly related both to the
responsiveness of government
to the needs of citizens and its
openness to citizen participation and
involvement. Local governments in
many parts of the world, given their
status as relatively new institutions,
have the opportunity to set a new
standard of excellence in terms of
accountability and transparency and,
in so doing, help reverse the growing
trend of citizen disillusionment with
government institutions.
2) Citizen empowerment is a
prerequisite for effective local
governance
One of the greatest virtues of
local government is its closeness to
the people it serves. All too often,
however, only part – frequently,
a minority – of the people being
governed are effectively involved
in, or in a position to influence,

their local governments. This is a
problem that especially affects the
poor, undermining the effectiveness
of local government as a democratic
institution and generator of
needed economic development.
It is critical that efforts to build
and strengthen local government
include major initiatives to
encourage the empowerment of all
citizens – especially the poor and
the marginalized. As experience in
many highly developed countries
has shown, the failure to undertake
such initiatives will have significant
costs, ranging from civil disorder
to a decline in confidence in
government.
3) Recognize the centrality
of an adequate and dependable
revenue base
In transitional and developing
countries, regional and local
governments often have very limited
revenue-raising capacity, making
them highly dependent on central
government subventions. As new
demands are brought to bear, they
become ever more reliant upon
national governments to provide
funding, either through routinized
fund transfers or by specific
appropriations. Such dependence
inevitably limits the capacity of
local governments to provide the
services their citizens require and to
play their full role in the process of
democratic institution building.
The authority and capacity to
raise revenue, whether through
imposing taxes and fees or
incurring reasonable debt, is
essential to building strong local
governments, not just because
revenue is a prerequisite for the
provision of effective and adequate
public services, but also because

the raising of revenue ultimately
forces local public officials to act
more responsibly. Public officials
who impose taxes upon the people
who vote them in or out of office
are more likely to remain attentive
to their constituents and behave
responsibly. Without this authority,
they remain dependent, giving
them the luxury to act irresponsibly
and pass important governing
responsibility on to others.
4) Build coalitions with
civil society
Another important development
during the past decade for those
concerned about the future of
democracy and good governance
has been the emergence of civil
society organizations. Both
through their own independent
activities and, increasingly, through
their ability to influence other
institutions, civil society and its
representatives are beginning to
shape the policies and actions of
local and national governments in
important ways. In many instances,
local civil society organizations
play important roles in assisting
emerging local governments to
identify and meet citizen’s service
delivery needs.
Governments, both at the national
and the local level, can create
environments that are friendly
and supportive of civil society
growth or that retard and limit
this development. Through the
protection of such basic rights as
freedom of speech, association and
press, as well as a variety of specific
legislative actions (including taxation,
financial support and regulatory
activity), national and local
governments can have a profound
impact on the ability of civil society
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institutions to develop and flourish.
When rivalry and conflict emerge
between local governments and civil
society organizations, especially as
they compete for international donor
funding, it harms all parties involved.
5) Strengthen local and central
government partnerships
The emergence of local
government has been one of the
most notable achievements of the
democratic institution building
efforts of the past several decades.
Grassroots activists, local and
national leaders, and international
organizations have all contributed
to this outcome. Over the past
decade, however, many national
governments have reduced their
commitment to this movement. In
most parts of the world, national
governments, through enabling
legislation and fiscal policies, shape
the environment within which local
governments operate and can either
limit or encourage their capacity to
act effectively.
Even the most permissive and
supportive national government,
if acting alone, cannot ensure
meaningful decentralization.
Significant local demand and
concern must exist for the
development and continuity of
local government. This is especially
so since the leaders of most
centralized government are not, in
truth, anxious to give up resources
or the authority to control them.
For political purposes, national
leaders often speak of the need to
encourage decentralization, build
local government capacity and
strengthen citizen participation, but
all too often such statements gain
meaning only when accompanied by
strong and substantial pressure from
14

the local community. Finally, it is
especially necessary to recognize that
strengthening one or another level
of government does not represent
a “zero-sum game” in the sense
that, if one level of government is
enhanced, another will inevitably
become weaker. Indeed, many
contemporary experiences suggest
quite the opposite: When one level
of government becomes stronger,
pressure builds for other levels of
government to follow suit.
6) Recognize the complexity and
fragility of reform
Government reform is inevitably
a complex and difficult process.
It frequently involves negotiating
among well-established interests
with a strong need and/or desire
to maintain existing practices.
Such groups will often vigorously
resist efforts to bring about
system reform. In transitional and
developing countries, the problem
of institutionalizing reform can
become even more complex. Often,
the institutions of government
are simply not strong enough to
implement significant reforms. In
other instances where reforms are
implemented, the pressure to revert
to past arrangements and practices is
often strong.
The process of institutional reform
can be further complicated by the
fact that many of the organizations
that support and encourage such
efforts frequently provide aid only in
the short term. Advocates for reform
frequently leave the scene much too
soon, giving those eager to limit or
avoid reform the opportunity to
do so with little or no resistance.
In other instances, economic or
political circumstances beyond
the control of the participants in

any reform process complicate
and undermine even well-planned
and organized reform initiatives.
Consequently, it is crucial that those
involved in the process of building
and/or reforming the institutions of
local governance recognize that such
efforts require both patience and a
long-term commitment.
In conclusion, while the United
States remains one of the most
politically decentralized countries
in the world, other countries have
begun to take significant steps
in this direction, introducing
local elections and strengthening
municipal institutions. Driving
many of these developments is an
underlying belief that dispersing
political power and emphasizing
local service delivery are important
steps in building and strengthening
democratic institutions, as well as
a significant factor in a nation’s
successful economic development.
Allan Rosenbaum is Professor of Public
Administration and Director of the
Institute for Public Management
and Community Service at Florida
International University.
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A Peruvian water distribution worker with a pipe fills a tank with drinking water on the dusty hillside of Pachacútec, a desert suburb, on January 22, 2015
in Lima Peru. Although Latin America is blessed with an abundance of fresh water, having 20% of global water resources in the Amazon Basin and the
highest annual rainfall of any region in the world, an estimated 50-70 million Latin Americans (one-tenth of the continent’s population) lack access to safe
water and 100 million people have no access to any safe sanitation. JAN SOCHOR/LatinContent/Getty Images.
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Has Decentralization Worked?
By Marcelo Giugale

T

hink back to the
1990s. The Soviet
Union had just
disintegrated. The
US economy was
on a roll. Technology and the
Internet were starting to connect
people, and democracy was
spreading fast, especially among
developing countries that never
had it before. The newspapers
were full of reports about new
presidents and voters speaking
up freely. Behind the headlines, a
more subtle political change was
taking place: Power was beginning
to shift from central governments
to states and municipalities. Vital
public services for the common
citizen – education, health, water,
electricity and many others – were
becoming the responsibility of
governors and mayors. With this
responsibility came money, some
in the form of transfers from the
national budget, some as new local
taxes, and some from lenders eager
to gain new clients. This was the
heyday of “decentralization,” the
catchy idea that closer proximity
– literally – between those who
govern and those who are governed
is always a good thing. No one can
know people’s preferences better
than their local authorities, right?
And if local leaders fail to deliver, it
is easier to hold them accountable –
after all, they are more likely to be
your neighbors. Decentralization,
or so the thinking went, was sure to
improve service, reduce corruption

and save money.
Several decades later, it is fair to ask:
Has decentralization worked? The
answer is a bit anticlimactic. When
it was done well, decentralization
did work. Success came with smart
design and careful implementation.
Decentralization was – and still is – a
high-risk, high-reward reform. A lot
can go wrong. Local bureaucracies
may not have the capacity to
manage a school system or a power
distribution network. They may not
have the “scale” to keep costs down.
You can negotiate better prices for,
say, garbage trucks if you buy them
by the thousands for a country rather
than by the dozen for a county.
Small-town politicians may be
easier to lobby – or to bribe. Labor
disputes, obsolete equipment and
irresponsible pension promises are
just some of the common problems
plaguing decentralized public services,
and federal governments are only
too happy to pass the blame on
to someone else. Left to fend for
themselves, remote poor areas may
become even poorer, while big cities
close to ports grow bigger and richer.
This is when geography begins to
matter and regional resentment
begins to fester. And then there is the
bailout issue: What should the central
government do if a local government
goes bankrupt? Can it watch and
do nothing as a province’s children
go without school and its hospitals
go without power? South America
is living proof that “the federation”
has no choice but to step in and pay

up, in effect making everyone in the
nation pay up, too.
With so much at stake, it is not
surprising that few countries can
claim success in decentralization.
In fact, there is no evidence that
when the government is more
decentralized, the economy grows
faster or is more stable. Not enough
data exist to tell one way or the other.
Nor is it clear that giving more power
to local governments automatically
translates into less poverty.
A growing inventory of
experiences from around the world
shows specific public services
improving – sometimes a lot – when
local authorities begin to run them.
For example, giving Swiss cantons
control over education raised
student test scores. In Canada and
Spain, infant mortality fell faster
when provinces were responsible for
it. Bolivian municipalities managed
to invest in water and sanitation
where it was most needed, leading
to healthier local populations.
Enrollment in Ethiopian primary
schools shot up when woredas
– a type of territorial division
somewhere between a neighborhood
and a municipality – were put in
charge. The list goes on. It is just as
easy to make a similar list, however,
of public services that deteriorated
when they were decentralized.
The real question is not whether
decentralization has worked or not,
but whether the cases where it has
succeeded share common factors.
This seems to be the case.
Hemisphere Volume 24

14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd 17

17

7/21/15 3:35 PM

Commentary

Across the region, new strategic partnerships have been developed to address local challenges creatively and effectively. Country Director of the World Bank
for Colombia and México, Gloria Grandolini (L), and Colombian singer and songwriter Juanes (R), founder of the Mi Sangre Foundation, attend a
joint press conference in Bogotá, Colombia, on July 16, 2013, to present their partnership achievements and progress in the field of peace education.
GUILLERMO LEGARIA/AFP/Getty Images.

First, decentralization makes
innovation easier. Governors and
mayors often experiment with
new ways to deliver old services.
Take the case of schools in Bogotá,
Colombia. In an effort to improve
its education system, the city
hired some of the best and most
exclusive private schools to run 25
educational centers in low-income
areas. Students in these “concession
schools” – where the power of
teacher unions was limited – did
much better on standardized tests
than their peers in the rest of the
public system. (Many actually
scored higher than their peers in
the parent private school!) It would
have been politically and practically
impossible for the central
government to try something like
that on a nationwide scale.
Second, technology helps
decentralization. In the past two
decades, computers, cellphones
and the web have made it easier to
control and provide public services
at the local level. Municipal officials
can now be trained online and
provided with the same information
as big bureaucracies in the capital.
They can learn from each other
with a click of a mouse. New
gadgets such as transponders,
18

remote meters and barcodes have
made it simpler to charge for
highways, water and licenses. And
how about the power of Twitter,
Facebook and YouTube to embarrass
the mayor if he is caught red-handed
committing an impropriety? Or
the local electricity company if it
fails to restore power fast enough?
Or the city’s sheriff if he keeps
pulling over drivers of a certain skin
color? Neighborhoods have instant
accountability at their fingertips.
Third, debt has to be kept low.
Over time, local governments
develop their own sources of income.
Many have received large transfers
from national sales of oil, gas and
minerals, making them more
creditworthy. Bankers have started
to offer them loans. Governors and
mayors who avoid, or are not allowed
to go on, borrowing binges do better
than those who do. Why? Because
paying off hefty debts means less
funding for schools, hospitals and
roads. The alternative is, of course,
to beg for money from the federal
government in exchange for political
favors – a very messy alternative. Not
surprisingly, central governments
have tried to ban or at least control
“subnational” borrowing, with mixed
results. (For good ways to regulate

this, see the example of Mexico.)
One might ask, if decentralization
needs such careful fine-tuning to
work well, why do it at all? The
answer is, because it’s what people
want. We like to choose our local
leaders and have a voice in the
services we use day in and day out.
There is no going back on that. The
genie of decentralization is out of
the bottle already. In the average
developing country, states and
municipalities are now in charge of a
fifth of all public expenditures. The
proportion is above a third in places
such as Argentina, India, Russia and
South Africa. It will continue to
grow. That’s why, the next time there
are local elections where you live, be
sure to vote.
Marcelo Giugale is Senior Director
of the World Bank’s Global Practice
for Macroeconomics and Fiscal
Management and author of
“Economic Development: What
Everyone Needs to Know.”
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Decentralization in Latin America:
History and Future Prospects
By Cristina A. Rodríguez-Acosta

L

atin America is a diverse
continent with more than
570 million inhabitants.
It is highly urbanized
(77.8% of the population
lives in cities), with great social and
economic inequalities.
This diversity extends to the
number of municipalities. Some
countries, such as Brazil, have more
than 5,000 municipalities, while
others, such as Uruguay, have as
few as 19. Municipal populations
also vary greatly among countries,
although nearly 90% of Latin
America’s municipalities have fewer
than 50,000 inhabitants (Rosales
and Valencia Carmona, 2008).
Similarly, Latin American
countries vary with regard to
the extent and depth of their
decentralization processes. Over
the last 30 years all countries
have initiated or deepened
political, administrative and fiscal
decentralization, although in some
instances, particularly in the case
of Venezuela, serious regression has
occurred.
Historically, Latin America has
been a region characterized by
highly centralized governments.
Only four countries – Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela – have
federal structures. All others are
organized in a unitary system but
with different structures of regional
and local governments and varying
degrees of decentralization. In all

countries, the national executive
branch predominates and politics
remain highly centralized (Rosales,
2012).
With the return to democracy
in many Latin American countries
in the 1980s and early 1990s, the
emphasis has been on political
decentralization. In the early 1980s,
very few countries elected their
local authorities by popular vote.
Today, mayors are directly and freely
elected in all countries except Cuba,
where candidates are nominated and
approved by the Cuban Communist
party. Administrative and fiscal
decentralization have followed
more slowly.
In general, the larger countries
of South America - Argentina,
Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia
and Ecuador – have initiated
important reforms and redistributed
competencies and resources to
subnational governments, but
not without many controversies
and difficulties. Mexico initiated
a policy of “new federalism” and
opened up its political system,
but administrative, political and
fiscal reform has tended to favor
state governments more than
local ones. Peru saw a slowdown
of decentralization under former
president Alberto Fujimori, but
the trend has re-emerged in the
years since 2000. Central America
and the Caribbean have moved
more slowly in this direction, with

countries such as Guatemala and
Nicaragua emphasizing political
decentralization and Honduras and
El Salvador moving incrementally
toward fiscal decentralization.
Costa Rica, one of the most stable
countries in Central America,
introduced the direct election of
mayors by popular vote as recently
as 2002. Panama, in contrast, has
registered very little progress towards
decentralization (Rosales, 2012;
Rosales and Valencia Carmona,
2008).
In terms of administration, the
trend has been to decentralize the
provision of certain services (in
particular, health and education)
to subnational governments. The
extent of these reforms varies greatly,
as does their financing and the legal
frameworks that regulate them.
Local governments in Latin
America are usually in charge of
providing such basic services as
trash collection, sewer and water
services, urban planning and
zoning, parks and recreation,
market regulation, transit, cultural
activities, environmental protection
and public safety. Some countries,
including Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and
Colombia, have gone further and
transferred additional services such
as primary health care, elementary
and secondary education, and other
social programs to local and regional
governments (Rosales, 2012). In
Argentina and Mexico, the three
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Hundreds of teachers demonstrate along the streets of Guatemala City on January 23, 2014 demanding that the government of Otto Perez Molina
increase the budget to improve education. JOHAN ORDONEZ/AFP/Getty Images.
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levels of government share delivery
of social programs, as well as health
and education, but in Central
America local governments have
had difficulty providing even basic
services. Fragmentation of policy
implementation has characterized
the decentralization process in
Latin America over the last 20
years, with little synchronization
between assigning responsibilities,
tax collection powers, transfers
from central governments, and
implementation capacity in many
countries (Lora, 2007).
Fiscal decentralization in Latin
America has also had a mixed
evolution over the last 30 years
and has been characterized by great
asymmetry between devolution
of expenditure and devolution of
taxing responsibilities (Brosio, 2012;
Martinez-Vasquez, 2011).
Between 1980 and 2009,
the percentage of subnational
governments’ expenditures as a
part of total national expenditures
increased from 11% to almost
19%, with countries such as
Colombia and Bolivia (both
unitary governments) showing
important increases, from 26%
to 33% and from 15% to 27%,
respectively. Since Fujimori, Peru
has also increased its subnational
expenditures from 9% to 34% of
total government expenditures.
Among federal countries, Brazil
shows the largest increase, from
32% to 55%, with Argentina and
Mexico recording important gains
as well. Venezuela experienced
the smallest increase, from 2.4%
to just 8%. Central American
countries generally show a decline in
subnational expenditures as a part of
total governmental expenditure. The
exception is El Salvador, which has

had a very small increase.
Latin American subnational
governments, and local governments
in particular, have as their main
source of revenue locally collected
taxes and fees (especially property
taxes); transfers from the central
government (conditioned or
unconditional); loans from different
financial institutions or agencies
(this option varies greatly by
country); and other revenue, such as
royalties, grants, gifts and donations.
The most common tax that almost
all countries in Latin America assign
to local governments is the property
tax, which is by far their largest
source of local revenue, though the
ability to collect it varies greatly by
region and country. Other taxes and
fees include vehicle registrations,
driver’s licenses, construction permits
and regulation of public markets.
One important aspect of
measuring fiscal decentralization is
the level of autonomy of subnational
governments to generate their own
revenue. In Dickovick’s ideal types
(2011), Latin American countries
range from moderate, with large
amounts of legally mandated
transfers and major tax bases but
inconsistent transfers (Brazil,
Argentina, and Colombia), and
low, with small amounts of legally
mandated transfers, minor tax
authority, and minimal transfers
(most other countries).
Adding to the lack of revenue
autonomy, many countries still have
insufficient expenditure autonomy.
Only six countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Uruguay and
Venezuela) allow local governments
to create new taxes, and in seven
others (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and
Uruguay) the regional or central

government has veto power over
local governments’ budgets. Many
countries suffer from a lack of local
administrative capacity, as well as
too much fragmentation (local
governments that are too small), a
lack of clear legal frameworks for
assigning expenditure responsibilities,
confusion over revenue sharing
(formulas are not clear, leading to
extended debates and discussions
over the conditionality or not of
revenue sharing), irresponsible
borrowing, and overreliance
on transfers from the central
government.
Because Latin American
subnational governments have come
to rely heavily on transfers from the
central government, their own tax
resources have remained stagnant
(Gomez Sabaini and Jimenez,
2012). This overreliance on transfers
exposes subnational governments
to budget cuts stemming from
macroeconomic fiscal and
economic imbalances, as occurred
during the 2008 economic crisis,
for example. It also makes them
vulnerable to conditions imposed
by central governments (Rezende
and Veloso, 2012) and to shifting
political alliances.
Some of the main flaws identified
by Rezende and Veloso (2012) in the
intergovernmental transfer system
in Latin America include the lack
of clear principles and objectives
for organizing such transfers, the
multiplicity of transfer sources
and criteria, rules that are neither
clear nor stable, new and multiple
conditions on the use of such
funds, and the absence of periodical
review of the transfer regime. This
overreliance creates a disincentive for
subnational governments to improve
their own revenue collection capacity
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Percentage of Total Governmental Expenditures by Subnational Governments
1980 to 2009
Brazil (1980)

32.4

Brazil (2008)

55.0

Argentina (1980)

22.2

Argentina (2006)

50.8

Mexico (1980)

22.0

Mexico (2007)

31.8

Venezuela (1979)

2.4

Venezuela (2007)

8.0

			
Colombia (1982)

26.3

Colombia (2006)

33.0

Ecuador (1980)

18.3

Ecuador (2004)

22.1

Bolivia 1986

14.8

Bolivia (2008)

27.0

Peru (1990)

9.1

Peru (2007)

34.0

Uruguay (1980)

8.6

Uruguay (2005)

13.2

El Salvador (1978)

5.8

El Salvador (2007)

7.0

Paraguay (1980)

5.5

Paraguay (2007)

6.5

Guatemala (1980)

4.5

Guatemala (2009)

4.4

Costa Rica (1980)

4.0

Costa Rica (2007)

3.7

Chile (1980)

3.7

Chile (2007)

14.0

Dominican Rep. (1980)

3.5

Dominican Rep. (2006)

5.3

Panama (1980)

2.0

Panama (2005)

1.7

Average Latin America

11.6

Average Latin America

18.9

Source: Adapted from Rosales (2012, page 25), based on IMF, World Bank, IDB, and UCLG data.
(Martinez-Vasquez, 2011), reducing
their negotiation ability vis-à-vis the
central government. Some of these
weaknesses need to be addressed if
subnational governments in Latin
America are to achieve expenditure
and revenue autonomy, both key
factors in the delivery of public
services.
Some final perspectives on
decentralization in Latin America
After more than 30 years of
political, fiscal, and administrative
decentralization, results in the
hemisphere are mixed, difficulties
and challenges are many, and, in
some instances, a sense exists that
decentralization is no longer a
22

priority. It could be that the region’s
tradition of strong executive
leadership and its resulting
tendency toward centralization is
too strong and difficult to overcome
(Restrepo, 2006).
Decentralization is by no means
the perfect answer to a country’s
development. It does not ensure
better service delivery, and it is not
the only factor influencing citizen
participation. Weak administrative
or technical capacity at the local
level can hinder the process, and
the resulting inefficiencies can entail
the loss of economies of scale. Local
elite capture of service delivery can
also be a serious problem, increasing
or creating tensions between local

and regional governments and
central governments over control
of scarce financial resources (World
Bank Report, 2007; Rondinelli, et
al 1984).
Nevertheless, some achievements
are associated with decentralization
in Latin America. These include
popular election of sub-regional and
local authorities. Further, the legal
framework for decentralization has
brought important political reforms
and increased citizen participation
in most countries. Subnational
governments have increased their
share of expenditures and revenues
and have more decision-making
authority as to how those funds can
be spent. The transfer to subnational
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Brazilian Minister of Planning Miriam Belchior talking during a press conference in Brasilia on August 29, 2013 about the increase in the 2014
budget. EVARISTO SA/AFP/Getty Images.

governments of policy-making
decisions and implementation has
contributed considerably to increased
capacity at the local level. Citizen
participation has led to innovations
in social policy implementation, as
well as the inclusion of previously
excluded social groups in the
policymaking process. Municipal
associations in particular have been
strengthened, and overall subnational
levels of government have taken a
more proactive role (Rosales, 2012).
Their increased relevance is reflected
in the number of subnational
authorities going on to become
national leaders in their countries.
Cristina A. Rodríguez-Acosta is
Deputy Director of the Institute for
Public Management and Community
Service at Florida International

University and a PhD candidate in
Public Administration.
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Basic Conditions for Decentralization and
State Reorganization in Latin America
By Víctor-Jacinto Flecha

I

t is a well-known fact that
the two major contributions
of the eighteenth-century
revolutions that led to the
organization of the modern
state are, first, the division of power,
facilitated by the French Revolution;
and second, the decentralized
system of power introduced by the
American Revolution. Both of these
revolutions adopted state structures
according to an existing political
praxis of social organization.
France, with a long tradition
of absolutism and centralization,
used the division of powers as a
method to disperse authority. A
decentralized system in France,
had it been implemented at that
time with the imposition of the
new democratic system, risked the
breakout of lawlessness, precisely
because of the absence of a tradition
of local governance.
The history of the United States
reflects the other side of this argument:
With its long tradition of local
development, including a citizenry
not only aware of its rights but also of
its duties and obligations to society,
the young nation would have found it
difficult, if not impossible, to install a
centralized system. This political reality
required the establishment of a federal
decentralized state, achieved via the
alignment and consolidation of the
states associated under the Articles of
Confederation.
The French and US cases highlight
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the fact that political systems are not
born by spontaneous generation,
but come about as the result of long
historical processes that reflect cultural
symbols and a vision of the past. The
great leaps of social change that occur
during a revolution also arise within a
set of complex processes. A revolution
is, in fact, a special situation that
exacerbates the fundamental political
and civil society relationship along key
elements. The new state arising from
this process will reflect the outcomes
and trade-offs between the defining
characteristics of various interests or
social sectors.
In this manner, the overthrow
of military dictatorship in South
America led to the emergence of
new democratic processes. Most
countries proclaimed new national
constitutions and approved
decentralized systems to secure
newly won freedoms and return to
citizens the power to decide their
own destinies, and, in so doing,
bring the state closer to the citizens.
These new governments worked to
enable people, either as individuals
or as a community, to participate in
the management of public affairs, a
right denied to them under previous
dictatorships.
Nonetheless, even while South
Americans were demanding their
rights and instituting measures to
limit the powers of political leaders,
there was still no consensus on the
best way to create institutions to

limit those powers and allow greater
citizen control. Many proponents
cited decentralization as a great way
to disperse state power, but it is
unclear how deeply they understood
the details and implications of
such a system, or whether it was
a bottom-up approach to politics.
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, for
example, adopted federal systems
in the nineteenth century but never
reached the level of decentralization
of the United States, nor did their
local governments gain sufficient
power and resources to manage
their own territories. Today, after
more than a quarter of a century of
decentralization in Latin America,
the results of this process vary among
countries. Some decentralized nations
are more successful than others,
and some have begun to reverse the
process and consolidate power in the
central government.
How can we explain the sluggish
adoption of decentralization policy
in the region? In principle, it should
be the best policy for countries
with absentee governments and
countless forgotten regions. One
possible explanation is a lack of social
eagerness to take advantage of the new
possibilities offered by a decentralized
system. The conservative opposition
exploits this weakness to block the
legislative and financial policies
that would allow for the complete
implementation of a comprehensive
decentralization policy.
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Several basic conditions must
be met prior to the initiation of
the decentralization process. The
average citizen needs to have a clear
understanding of what decentralized
power means, the political class
has to have a real desire to pursue
decentralization, and strong and
able institutions must exist at the
local level of government. Another
key factor is a society in which
individuals are capable of assuming
their role as citizens. Without these
conditions, which must progress in
unison, the decentralization process
will be only symbolic.
To help meet the above conditions,
the international organizations that
support democratization in Latin
America should take into account
the differences between countries
in the region and their historical
experiences. Projects and strategies
cannot be transferred from one
country to another without passing
through cultural filters. They must
address the various issues that make
for an empowered local government,
including leveraging the local cultural
elements that strengthen citizen
participation and control without
overlooking crucial capacity building
and training of municipal officials.
Víctor-Jacinto Flecha is President of
the Paraguayan NGO COPLANEA,
which is dedicated to strengthening
local governments in Paraguay. He
is a sociologist and political scientist,
professor and political analyst, and
author of numerous books and articles.
In December 2014, he received the
Diploma of Civil Heroes of Paraguay,
awarded by the International Center
for the Promotion of Human Rights
under the auspices of UNESCO for
unwavering struggle for democratic
values and human rights.

Amazonian indigenous activists march from Trinidad, Beni department in northeastern
Bolivia toward La Paz, June 21, 2010, to ask President Evo Morales to assign budgets to their
autonomous governments. CARLOS VARGAS/AFP/Getty Images.
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Mexican Decentralization in the
Context of an Evolving Nation
By Ilyana Albarrán

D

ecades of
decentralization
efforts have,
without doubt,
brought changes to
the Mexican federal system. The
democratization process of the
1980s resulted in a shift of power
to the local level and an insistence
on reform. This resulted in the
decentralization of decision-making
authority to local governments,
with legislation that allowed for a
more transparent, formula-driven
distribution of fiscal transfers.
Political pluralism began in 1988,
with opposition parties progressively
winning state elections and reducing
the power of the hegemonic party.
For 70 years (1929-2000), a
single political party, the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI),
had effectively concentrated power
in the executive branch. Political
pluralism was promptly followed by
electoral reforms, with the period of
democratic transition culminating in
2000, when majority control of the
national government shifted from
the PRI to the Partido de Acción
Nacional (PAN).
During the 1980s-90s transition,
constitutional amendments limited
state authority and redefined
municipal responsibilities.
Municipalities benefited from the
strengthening of their powers and
resources through reform of Article
115 of the Constitution in 1983
and 1999. These modifications
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On December 2, 2012 in Mexico City, President Enrique Pena Nieto and the main three political
parties of Mexico signed an agreement to launch reforms to strengthen democracy, fight social
inequality and promote economic growth. ALFREDO ESTRELLA/AFP/Getty Images.

decentralized responsibility for
the management of basic services
to the municipal levels, giving
municipalities the right to collect
property taxes from private
industries. In addition, new fiscal
formulas distributed federal funds
more transparently and reliably.
Reforms allowed municipalities to
organize their public administrations
and regulate their service delivery.
Municipal fiscal and regulatory
responsibilities and power increased
significantly; no longer mere
administrative bodies controlled
by a national government run by
a single political party, municipal
councils ceased their dependence on
the resources and decisions of the

Presidency of the Republic.
Following fiscal decentralization,
efforts grew to increase citizen
participation in the allocation of
resources at the local level, with the
aim of bringing government closer
to the people. Poverty alleviation
programs were designed to allow
communities to manage projects
within their communities, with the
goal of creating more accountability
for federal funds and locally raised
revenue destined for public works
and social programs. Municipal
governments are currently the
principal institutional players in
the operation of public policy at
the local level, including urban
development and planning, local
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transportation, building permits,
public services, municipal public
security and, to varying degrees,
health and education policy.
The focus on decentralization
has brought an enormous increase
in the role of local government in
shaping the nation’s future. At the
same time, however, frustration with
the country’s systemic inequality
and corruption, especially the
collusion between law enforcement
and drug trafficking interests, have
called into question the ability of
decentralization efforts alone to
bring about a less corrupt and more
accountable government.
Mexico, despite being the world’s
fourteenth largest economy, continues
to be plagued by high levels of
inequality. The country’s Gini
index score — a measure of income
inequality — places Mexico at a
comparable level with much poorer
countries, including Paraguay and
Bolivia. Moreover, in 2014, Mexico
scored a dismal 35 on Transparency
International’s index of perceived
public sector corruption, on a scale
ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to
100 (no corruption). Drug traffickers
routinely infiltrate and control police
and prosecutors at the municipal, state
and federal levels. Atrocities such as
the police abduction and massacre of
43 students in Guerrero in September
2014, at the direct order of municipal
authorities, paint a grim picture of
some of the newly empowered local
authorities and their ability to govern.
Since the massacre, 19 more mass
graves have been found in the area
and 26,000 people remain missing.
Overall, the drug war has claimed
more than 100,000 lives across the
country since 2006.
Attempts to strengthen Mexico’s
municipalities have come at the cost

of weakening the national state. As
the Mexican federal government
lost its power to take action as a
single body, lower-level governments
became more autonomous and able
to act independently in discordance
with the central government.
Criminal organizations, able to
seek protection from conflicting
government powers, have
increased their propensity for
violent confrontation, effectively
creating their own private armies.
Following the student massacre in
Guerrero, for example, the federal
government took 10 days to open
an investigation of the crime, and
the army – even with a military
base close to the incident - was
unable to stop the kidnapping or the
incineration of the student’s bodies.
State oversight is a requirement
for establishing accountability, and
different levels of government need
to coordinate security operations.
Local governments must serve
the needs of their constituents
while coordinating with state and
federal agencies to create unified
leadership for the future. Mexico’s
democratic transition and its
concurrent political decentralization
have fallen short of empowering
society at the local level; instead,
the transition has only diversified
power bases for members of
the business and political class.
In recent polls, confidence in
government institutions, such as
the police, military and politicians
at all levels, has fallen drastically.
The resulting lack of government
legitimacy has led to apathy, less
voting, and less participation at the
local level, putting democracy at
risk. To address this threat, Mexico
is in need of structural overhaul
and civil service reforms to target

impunity and corruption within
municipalities and all levels of
government to restore confidence
in bureaucratic and political
institutions.
Ilyana Albarrán is a PhD Candidate
in Public Administration at Florida
International University.
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Managing Subnational Debt in Times
of Crisis: Lessons from Mexico
By Heidi Jane Smith

C

apital markets in the
developing world
have grown in recent
years. This is nowhere
more prevalent than in
Mexico, which now has four options
for state and local governments to
obtain loans. Public officials may
select from development bank loans,
commercial banks, trust funds, or
bonds tradable on the Mexican
security market. With the plethora
of options, Mexican subnational
governments are taking out more
loans for productive measures to
encourage economic development.
Many state governments have
substantial debt loads, but municipal
public officials are only now seeing
the influence of these loans on their
local economies. The news media
have warned of the potential problem:
“Fiscal Hole. State public finances
faced a difficult fourth quarter of
2014 due to an accumulated gap
of $1.1 billion pesos missing from
federal contributions,” reported Mario
Verdusco in a February 3, 2015 article
in El Universal, a Mexican daily. Also
in El Universal, José Manuel Arteaga
reported on August 13, 2009: “State
and local authorities are hedging and
issuing debt in order to deal with the
financial crisis.”
The global financial crisis of
2007-09 had strong repercussions
in Mexico, and the recent decrease
in the price of oil has raised fears
of financial trouble in the near
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future. Mexico’s closeness to the
US economy, especially because of
its free trade relationship through
NAFTA, has created inevitable
economic slowdowns. In an
effort to reduce the effects of the
financial crisis, then President
Felipe Calderon allocated the
largest obligation in history, more
than 1.8 billion pesos (around
US$120 million) to the national
development bank (Banco Nacional
de Obras y Servicios Públicos,
or Banobras) to finance small,
economically feasible projects at the
state and local government levels,
but low oil prices have slowed
economic growth.
The administrative structure of
municipal debt in Mexico
Since the 1997 reform of Article
9 of the Fiscal Coordination Law
(Ley de Coordinación Fiscal, or
LCF), which gave municipalities
the right to take out commercial
bank loans, Mexico has seen a new
emphasis on public debt. Part of
the decentralization efforts of the
1990s, the LCF aimed to centralize
tax collection efforts at the state
government level so the federal
government could redistribute the
national budget fairly and equitably
across Mexico’s 2,400 municipalities,
32 states and capital district. Mexican
states collect tax and leasing fees,
and municipalities have the right to
collect small fees and other minor

taxes. The LCF created a system of
federal transfers, earmarking 85%
of state revenues for social programs
and another 7% for non-earmarked
discretionary funds. But the new
tax system created large fiscal holes
in local government accounts, and
without appropriate incentives
and policies to encourage local
governments to collect taxes, fiscal
federalism has failed to live up to
expectations. Many state and local
governments have turned to the
municipal bond market to leverage
additional revenues to finance
public projects and infrastructure
development.
Along with fiscal decentralization,
the political environment has opened
up to vastly greater competition. In
1997, the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) lost its majority control
in the national congress after nearly
a century of hegemony. It lost the
presidency as well to the rightleaning National Action Party (PAN)
in 2000. The PRI reclaimed the
presidency in 2012, but by then
Mexican politics had become more
competitive than ever before. In this
new climate of political competition,
municipal governments have had
more opportunities to increase
their debt usage, especially during
election years (Ibarra, 2009; Benton
and Smith, 2013), when, some
analysts have argued, both state
and local governments use debt for
political promises.
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Although Mexico’s overall subnational debt is still relatively small compared to other forms of credit available in the country, current budget constraints at the
local level could fuel excessive funding trends in the absence of national legislation governing the rights and responsibilities of subnational governments.

Mexico’s subnational debt
framework is a hybrid between
rules-based and market-based
approaches (Canuto and Liu, 2010).
Specifically, current legislation
encourages local governments to
seek out private rating agencies to
appraise their budgets, although
not all municipal governments have
a rating or can afford to hire an
agency. With positive evaluations of
their financial systems, operational
activities, economic profiles and
performance, local governments
can find better terms and sources
for their public sector loans. The
Mexican Ministry of Finance
requires state and local governments
to report long-term debt loads
directly to the federal government,
which provides oversight of
subnational capital markets by
monitoring the total loan amounts.
States typically set debt ceilings; for
example, as a percentage of GDP,

a ratio of debt to state income, or
a set total. This is an effort to limit
municipal borrowing capacity,
which has the potential to spin out
of control.
Increased consumption
of municipal debt
Total subnational debt in Mexico
grew from 990 pesos per capita in
2001 to 3,450 pesos per capita in
2011 (Benton and Smith, 2013).
Yet, Mexico has a very low debtto-GDP ratio: slightly more than
40%, with the state and municipal
portion hovering around 2.5%
(IMF, 2012). For comparison,
debt levels in Chile in 2009 were
around 13% of GDP, while in Brazil
they were around 48% (Carranza,
Daude and Melguizo, 2011). The
pace of subnational government
debt accelerated during the 2009
economic crisis, when national
GDP decreased substantially (by

around 6.5%). The last quarter of
2014 was difficult for the public
finances of Mexican states, which
accumulated a gap of 1.1 billion
pesos (approximately US$77 million)
due to lower federal contributions.
The fiscal gap reported by all states
during that period is partially
explained by the decrease in national
accounts from the collecting of oil
rents (Verdusco, 2015).
All forms of subnational debt in
Mexico that are subject to sovereign
risk are guaranteed by the national
government (including some
corporate loans, financing for stateowned enterprises, municipal and
state bonds, and credit for public
private partnerships), the assumption
being that the government of a
sovereign nation will honor its debt
obligations. Mexico’s sovereign rating
is very high for Latin America, and it
was only the second country in the
region after Chile to earn a coveted
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Mexico’s Ministry of Finance may need to review, publicize and improve bankruptcy laws to cope with moral hazard issues. In the United States, for
example, Chapter 9 bankruptcy clauses have helped avoid numerous federal bailouts in recent history. These laws assist in deterring politicians and public
budgeting professionals from taking out too much debt and create alternative clauses, such as Chapter 11, to identify ways to renegotiate debt packages.

“A” grade from Moody’s. The recent
upgrade to A3 from Baa1 was the
result of economic reforms President
Enrique Peña Nieto pushed through
Congress during the last part of 2013
(Sarmiento, 2015). Mexico’s peso
and leading share index both turned
positive after the upgrade, which
should help lower the country’s
national borrowing costs.
Although Mexico’s overall
subnational debt is still relatively
small compared to other forms
of credit available in the country,
current budget constraints at the
local level could fuel excessive
funding trends in the absence
of national legislation governing
the rights and responsibilities of
subnational governments. Proposals
for such legislation include: 1)
harmonizing state and local
government accounting standards;
2) increasing transparency and
improving reporting requirements; 3)
30

expanding fiscal policy by reviewing
policies for managing debt sources;
and 4) improving bankruptcy laws to
cope with moral hazard issues.
How to manage the common
pool resource
Mexico has learned many lessons
from developed countries on how to
limit state and local borrowing while
allowing the local debt market to
work with little national government
control (Laubach, 2005; Kincaid,
2012). Historically, voters have acted
as a political constraint on curbing
the common pool resource problem
of overreaching municipal debt
in the United States. Von Hagen
(1991) explained that the principalagent aspect of the voter-politician
relationship helps the electorate
constrain politicians from taking out
too much debt. Yet, he found that
politicians are likely to find ways to
circumvent the rules as necessary

for self-interest. For example, a
governor’s veto power can serve to
eliminate or change rules regarding
incurring debt (Von Hagen, 1991).
Subnational governments,
including states, cantons and
provincial governments, should have
the authority to create balanced
budget rules, whether statutory or
constitutional; establish tax and
expenditure limitations, if they
so choose; or create some sort of
local bankruptcy or fiscal distress
provisions in their state constitutions
(Spiotto, Acker and Appleby, 2012).
State variations reflect local policy
preferences and fiscal decisions
at the local level. Rodden (2006)
suggests fiscal discipline can only
be created to constrain subnational
credit markets when there is a strong
national government. Ultimately,
the most important element of
fiscal rules is how to control public
managers from over-consuming
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the common pool at all levels of
government. Mexico reformed its
accounting codes in 2012, and the
National Auditors Association is
implementing the new rules.
State governments can set balanced
budget requirements, tax and
expenditure restrictions, and debt
limitation schemes. Mexican states
have improved their transparency
laws and reporting requirements by
creating fiscal rules and reporting all
long-term debt to the Undersecretary
for Debt. State governments have
also expanded their fiscal policy
by publicizing their debt packages.
This includes announcing sources of
public debt (from commercial banks,
Banobras, trust funds or bonds)
and identifying how each loan will
be paid off, either from budget
expenditures or user fees. Local
governments can identify better
rates for their debt loads and find
the best terms for their public sector
loans. Ascertaining local own source
income, such as user fees and service
fees to be paid directly to their loans,
also decreases costs. Cost benefit
analysis or feasibility studies can be
used to identify if a project is viable
and requires long-term finances.
Finally, the Ministry of Finance
may need to review, publicize
and improve bankruptcy laws to
cope with moral hazard issues.
The literature questions whether
sanctioning public officials, either
with punitive charges or financial
ones, will deter violators (Spiotto,
Acker and Appleby, 2012). Some
academics argue that over-scrutiny
of small amounts of corruption
is no deterrent for public officials
(Levitin, 2012), especially when
large-scale corruption is often not
exposed. In the United States, for
example, Chapter 9 bankruptcy

clauses have helped avoid numerous
federal bailouts in recent history
(Kelemen and Teo, 2014). These
laws assist in deterring politicians
and public budgeting professionals
from taking out too much debt
and create alternative clauses, such
as Chapter 11, to identify ways to
renegotiate debt packages. Clear
rules, strong public management
principles, and improved financial
systems and planning will ensure
sustainable subnational public
finances in the future.
Heidi Jane Smith received her PhD
from Florida International University
and is currently an adjunct professor
at George Mason University. She
served as a visiting scholar at the
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de
México (ITAM).
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Decentralization and Intergovernmental
Relations in Colombia:
Issues for a State Still Searching for Structure and Capacity
By Pablo Sanabria

T

his article explores
some aspects of
intergovernmental
relations with the aim
of identifying key
elements to help advance a better
understanding of decentralization in
Colombia. We begin by analyzing
two decades of decentralization in
Colombia, going on to propose some
central questions and identifying key
challenges and recommendations.
History of intergovernmental
relations in Colombia
In 1991, Colombia passed a new
constitution in response to strong
citizen activism, particularly from
college students, demanding a new
set of institutional arrangements
for a state that was falling apart
under the manifold pressures of
drug lords, guerrillas, urban crime
and paramilitary factions. This
constitution made Colombia a
unitary decentralized state.
Despite some steps toward
decentralization before this point,
including the adoption of the
popular vote to elect municipal
mayors and department (provincial)
governors, the 1991 constitution
was the key to adapting the nation’s
political and administrative structure
to a less centralized model. The new
constitution was also an opportunity
to respond to the persistent demands
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of regional politicians and key local
actors for greater autonomy.
The new institutional arrangements
allowed departments and
municipalities to implement social
policy directly, specifically health
and education policy. This decision
considerably increased transfers
from the central government to
municipalities and departments, but
above all, it increased the amount
of resources directly managed
by subnational units. Colombia
ranks high among Latin American

countries in terms of such transfers
(See Figure 1), but demand for
greater decentralized autonomy
remains high.
In spite of continuous efforts
to improve provincial autonomy,
Colombia’s subnational
governments still show divergent
levels of institutional capacity. As
Figure Two shows, subnational
governments’ dependence on the
central government has remained
almost unchanged during the last
decade. The levels of fiscal effort of

Figure 1
Total Revenue Distribution Subnational Governments,
Selected Latin American Countries 2008 (% Total)
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Best Practices Panel at Florida International University’s XX Inter-American Conference of Mayors: “Building Sustainable, Equitable and Smart
Cities: New Challenges for Latin America,” held in Miami June 9-12, 2014. From left to right: Hon. James Cañas Rendón, Mayor, Municipality of
Montenegro, Colombia; Dr. Allan Rosenbaum, Director, Institute for Public Management and Community Service, Florida International University;
Hon. Angel Erreyes, Mayor, Municipality of Yantzaza, Ecuador; Mr. Lenin Villeda Carvajal, Manager, Mancomunidad of Guisayote, Honduras; and
Mr. Gustavo Espinoza Gómez, Administrative and Financial Manager, Municipality of La Molina, Peru. FELIPE SOTO.

municipalities and departments still
appear low in the Latin American
context, although they have increased
over the last two decades.
Even more, the relevant data shows
an enormous degree of disparity

in institutional capacity among
subnational units (i.e. Antioquia
or Valle del Cauca compared to
neighboring Chocó). Although
some regions exhibit greater ability
to implement policies and generate

Figure 2
Transfers from Central Government to Municipalities and
Departments (Provinces), Colombia 2000 – 2014
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fiscal resources, most of the country´s
municipalities and departments still
rely heavily on central government
transfers and technical assistance.
Exploring and explaining the
challenges of decentralization in
Colombia
Since 1991, a number of social
actors have shown greater interest
in effectively implementing
decentralization efforts. That goal
remains distant. Three important
elements explain some of the
difficulties that Colombia has faced
in this process: 1) a de jure vs. de
facto gap in decentralization; 2)
an existing dichotomy between
providing autonomy and ensuring
institutional capacity; and 3) a high
level of divergence in public policy
that tends to deepen dependence on
the central government.
Colombia epitomizes the tendency
of developing countries to issue
norms in response to administrative
problems with very low
enforcement capacity. The country’s
decentralization strategy relies on
normative efforts that look like a
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good idea on paper but in practice
are not implemented, given the lack
of state capacity. Decentralization in
Colombia embodies important legal
advancements, but in terms of actual
implementation a number of goals
remain to be achieved, including
local fiscal responsibility and
autonomy, improved institutional
capacity, etc. The point is, while a
law can distribute and decentralize
power, it cannot always distribute
institutional capacity, which
varies widely between subnational
governments.
Colombia has aimed to improve
the autonomy of municipalities and
departments. The catch is ensuring
that each area has the institutional
capacity to take advantage of this
increased autonomy. The actual
autonomy of the subnational units
to administer resources from central
government transfers is restricted,
since the central government
predefines the use of such resources.
Additionally, while the bigger
municipalities have greater leeway
to manage their own resources,
many smaller and medium sized
municipalities still depend on the
provincial level, creating a new locus
of conflict between departments and
municipalities.
The decentralized unitary model
of 1991 continues to evolve while
adjusting to the realities and
capacities of both the national
and subnational governments.
In principle, a model based on
autonomy should reveal differences
in orientation and shape between
national and subnational policies,
while maintaining the overall criteria
for defining action frameworks and
policy instruments. In practice,
however, what has emerged is a
high level of technical dependence
34

on the national government,
particularly in policy formulation.
The central government remains
the main provider of policy, given
that many subnational units lack
the institutional capacity to fully
implement this legislation.
Decentralization
agenda for Colombia
These challenges demand a better
understanding of the context of
intergovernmental relations in
Colombia to reduce the gaps between
de jure and de facto decentralization
and the divergence between the
different layers of governance. The
following recommendations, though
not exhaustive, aim to open avenues
for rethinking the formulation and
workings of intergovernmental
relations in Colombia. They can
be understood as both a research
agenda and also as a policy agenda
for the government to enhance the
decentralization process.
1. What is the optimal level of
vertical cooperation between
national and subnational
governments? Research should
work to identify the actual
modes by which the center and
the territories relate to each
other, especially the formal,
and more important, informal
mechanisms whereby the center
and the regions work together
and separately. The state should
develop empirical studies to
disentangle the various effects of
the Colombian decentralization
process in public policy
(formulation, implementation,
etc.) and generate evidence
for the benefits of an
intergovernmental collaborative
model beyond the usual
federalism/centralism clichés.

2. Just as important as the
relationship between the
center and the territories, an
understanding is also critical
of the controversial and
divergent relationship between
the provincial level and the
municipalities. Studies should
identify the new forms of
horizontal collaboration that
have appeared in response to
decentralization efforts or suggest
a new set of intergovernmental
communication mechanisms
for those units with low
institutional capacity. Horizontal
intergovernmental relations must
become more diversified, along
with mechanisms to address
problems that exist outside of
the traditional administrative
boundaries between (and within)
departments and municipalities.
3. The field should also pursue a
regionally based and contextually
driven definition of institutional
capacity versus the traditional
central government definition.
Research needs to expand the
definition of what it means to
be capable in regional terms.
Territories, departments and
municipalities are inherently
different; in a country like
Colombia, these institutions
are affected in different ways,
and in varying magnitudes, by
innumerable phenomena (i.e.,
conflict, poverty, inequality, etc.).
Forcing these diverse units into
a single measurement of their
ability is unfair and unhelpful.
Researchers should consult with
departments and municipalities
about their goals, expectations
and abilities to define a more
comprehensive concept of
institutional capacity in its
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various dimensions. A regionally
articulated construction of
development plans could help to
initiate these shifts.
4. The deployment of regionally
based information systems is key
to a better understanding of the
policy process at the subnational
level. The central government
can help generate better policies
at the municipal and provincial
levels by releasing reliable and
systematic information on
key topics such as budget and
financial administration, local
management, policy formulation
and implementation. A
dependable regional information
system would facilitate multilevel
governance by enabling
the central government to
develop an informed view of
developments in the territories.
In turn, this information could
help subnational governments
better use evidence and
implement best practices in
decision-making and policy.
The role of the National
Planning Department is crucial
in developing such a system.
5. Generating public management
skills at the subnational
level involves more than the
implementation of centrally
issued protocols, paperwork
and checkpoints. Subnational
units need support to develop
public management capacity and
specific competencies at the local
level. A new strategy could take a
different approach to the current
organizational structure at the
national level and reconsider how
central government offices and
officials are dispersed across the
territory. This type of capacity
development strategy should

also include a formal plan of
action with contingent technical
assistance for the development
of hard management skills at
the local level (e.g. budgeting,
human talent, organizational
development) as well as
cognitive skills (e.g. leadership,
effective communication,
teamwork, ethics). Universities
have an important role to play
as repositories of knowledge
and sources of creativity,
development and innovation.
6. Last, but not least, the nation
must take immediate concrete
action to strengthen human
capital at the local levels of
government. Different programs
have sought to improve local
capacities in such fields as public
finance, program formulation
and investment projects, but
less attention has been given
to the creation of a modern,
professional civil workforce
in Colombia´s subnational
units. Despite recognition that
clientelism and cronyism still
prevail in some municipalities
and departments (Sanabria,
2010), few concrete actions
(either central or regional)
address these fundamental
problems. Colombia clearly
needs a unified strategy to
ensure the adoption of a
merit-based civil service in
the territories. Enhancing
the recruitment and selection
processes of the National Civil
Service Commission (CNSC)
is a key step in any effort
to create a professional civil
service, with the input of the
Administrative Department of
the Public Function (DAFP)
and the Higher School of

Public Administration (ESAP)
(Sanabria et al, 2014). The
creation of a formalized,
merit-based public service,
like the other topics discussed
above, requires a bottomup approach that takes into
account the particular traits and
requirements of the territories,
as well as their own political and
administrative processes.
Pablo Sanabria, PhD, is an assistant
professor in the Alberto Lleras
Camargo School of Government at
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia.
The author would like to thank
research assistants Nicolás Acevedo
and Juan Sebastián González for their
contributions.
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Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff delivers a speech during a ceremony at the city hall in São Paulo, Brazil, on July 31, 2013. Rousseff announced the
investment of R$ 8.1 billion (USD 3.5 billion) for urban mobility projects, infrastructure and housing in the city of São Paulo.
NELSON ALMEIDA/AFP/Getty Images.
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Brazil: A Prime Example of
Decentralization – and
Recentralization
By Gretha Burchard

W

hile reforms
aiming at
decentralization
have taken
place in many
Latin American nations, the case
of Brazil is particularly interesting.
The history of Brazil’s government
system is often referred to as a
cyclical one, with decentralizing
and recentralizing regimes taking
turns in power. Today, 30 years
after the transition from military
dictatorship to a federal republic,
decentralization remains an
important force shaping the
Brazilian government – as does
recentralization.
When Brazil first became a
republic in 1889, it gave states and
municipalities a high degree of
autonomy. The country experienced
two major moves towards
recentralization in the twentieth
century, first under the dictatorship
of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1937) and
again during the military regime
(1964-1984). While the first decade
of the military dictatorship was
marked by an economic boom, in
the 1970s an increasing amount of
debt and inflation led to protests
and strikes. Rapidly increasing
urbanization was accompanied
by a dramatic increase in poverty,
with social movements pushing for
reforms, a return to democracy and

regional autonomy.
The election of José Sarney in
1985 is regarded as the moment
when democracy returned to Brazil.
In an effort to reverse the economic
recession, Sarney decided to fight
inflation and high external debt
by following a strict plan of price
controls and salary reductions.
While the immediate outcomes
seemed successful, his plan
ultimately failed. Brazil faced severe
economic challenges, including
hyperinflation, income inequality
and a weak import substitution
industrialization program. At the
same time, the government made
little headway on social issues such
as high illiteracy, poverty, infant and
maternal mortality, violent crime,
and access to basic sanitation. The
consequence was a strong public
reaction against the centralized
government and increasing pressure
to decentralize authority to local
units. Subnational governments and
regional elites, longing for authority
over finances and administration,
played an important role in shaping
new laws.
In 1988, Brazil passed a new
constitution that emphasized
democratization, universal
rights-based welfare, the
professionalization of public
management, federal cooperation
to reduce regional inequalities, and

the creation of municipal public
services. State and municipal
autonomy increased significantly,
particularly in the areas of health,
education and social policy.
The challenges facing Brazil on
its path to a decentralized form of
government became obvious soon
after the promulgation of the new
constitution. The overall aim was
high autonomy for local government
and greater efficiency at all levels,
but in practice decentralizing
decision-making power turned
out to be complicated. The lack of
accountability and coordination
between federal, state and
municipal authorities caused several
subnational governments to accrue
major fiscal deficits.
Brazil’s approximately 5,570
municipalities are not subdivisions
of its 26 states, as they are in other
federal systems; instead, they are
part of the federation. The 1988
Constitution granted the states
a number of exclusive powers,
including control over the criminal
justice system and police force.
Other responsibilities, such as
education, health, and economic
development, are shared between
state and national governments.
The municipalities, in turn, share
all of these responsibilities with the
national and state level. The only
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The mayor of Florianopolis, Brazil in Coconut Park for the ninth edition of Prefeitura no Bairro which aims to engage citizens in public administration
and provide enhanced public services for the general population. DIRCINHA WELTER/Moment/Getty Images.
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area in which they have complete
responsibility is transport.
State governments, given
their stronger political position,
the lack of a clear separation of
powers between municipal and
state authorities, and disparities in
financial resources, often obtain
the most advantageous terms when
negotiating with local government
units. Power struggles have also
developed between the state and
federal level, with some federal
legislators regarding their positions
as merely a steppingstone to
becoming governor of their home
states and therefore privileging them
in their legislative work.
In recent years, Brazil has reversed
some of the autonomy granted to
states and municipalities, ostensibly
to prevent further inequality. The
reversal includes such measures as
reducing discretionary transfers to
state and municipal authorities,
requiring them to publish revenue
and spending accounts, and making
public servants legally liable for
their actions. To some critics, a
recentralization of powers was
needed to fight organizational chaos
as well as corruption and nepotism.
However, another approach to the
accountability of local officials has
been to increase citizen participation
in the decision-making process. The
Municipality of Porto Alegre, for
example, introduced participatory
budgeting in 1989. By 2007, this
policy had spread to more than 100
Brazilian municipalities. A similar
measure is the establishment of
Local Citizen Councils.
Specific sectors reflect the trends
toward de- and recentralization,
respectively. Two sectors often seen
as success stories are public health
and education. The new constitution

establishes universal access to free
health care, with municipalities
receiving federal transfers to
provide health care services. It took
more than 20 years to make the
decentralized and universalized
health care system work effectively,
but as a result infant and maternal
mortality rates decreased by 50%;
life expectancy increased by nine
years, from 64 to 73 years; and
universal immunization for most
major diseases has been achieved.
Educational reforms seem to have
followed a similar trajectory. The
constitution envisaged universal,
decentralized education, and 20
years later the adult literacy rate had
increased from 75 to 90%. Universal
primary school enrollment is now a
reality, and the number of primary
and secondary students leaving
school has decreased by 50%.
A closer look at the health care
and education sectors suggests,
however, that they developed in
rather different ways. While the
education sector was always wellfunded at all three government
levels, the government had severe
problems distributing health
care funding effectively. Several
recentralizing reforms were necessary
to provide for fairer, more efficient
and effective service provision. The
two sectors also differed regarding
their reform champions. While the
education reforms were initiated
and promoted by cabinet ministers
and other government officials, a
number of social movements pushed
for health care reform. Nevertheless,
both approaches have led to effective
cooperation by all three levels of
government and, eventually, to
successful outcomes benefiting the
Brazilian people.
Equally interesting is the case of

social welfare policy. Due to the
aforementioned power struggles and
differing capacities for generating
revenue, regional inequalities
increased and poorer governments
were more dependent on the federal
government to finance the provision
of services. To address these
problems, several constitutional
amendments reversed some of the
autonomy that had been granted to
subnational governments. Targeted
conditional cash transfer programs
had first been implemented at the
local level, but in the late 1990s the
federal government began issuing
monthly payments directly to
financially underprivileged citizens.
The reason for the centralization
was the urgent need to find efficient
ways of dealing with extreme
poverty while at the same time
preventing pork barrel politics at the
local level. The new policies led to a
recentralization of decision-making
power and implementation at the
federal level.
A prime example of a conditional
cash transfer program is the “Bolsa
Família.” It provides poor families
with cash transfers if their children
attend school and have regular
health checkups. The money
comes from the federal level, but
the success of the program relies
on well-functioning cooperation
between the center and the
municipalities; therefore, it can
be regarded both as an example of
recentralization, on the one hand,
and of successful collaboration
between municipalities and the
federal government, on the other.
The program has been criticized
for “only” distributing money
without looking for alternatives
for generating income and
employment, but it is also praised
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for having contributed to the social
empowerment of women and the
reduction of inequality and poverty.
One important outcome of
fiscal decentralization has been
the increase in local government
capacity. In the 1990s, Brazil
made tax collection at the local
level compulsory. The stable
decentralization of tax resources
has benefited municipalities and
states. Ten years after the new
constitution was promulgated, own
local revenue had increased from 0.7
to 1.6% of GDP, exceeding federal
constitutional transfers. The federal
government levied 22.9% of the
GDP and the states, 9.5%. In 2001,
local governments managed 12.5%
percent of Brazil’s total public
revenue, considering own revenue
and main constitutional transfers.
Adding federal grants, municipal
governments administered 15.5%
of total public revenue. On average,
local governments made a successful
effort to raise their own revenue by
modernizing their fiscal systems,
changing their methods of property
value evaluation, and increasing
their service activity.
In sum, 26 years after the
promulgation of Brazil’s new
constitution, reforms in the health,
education and welfare sectors
have had clear positive results.
Some issues, however, such as the
lack of alternatives for generating
income and employment, have
not been successfully tackled. One
striking feature of Brazil has been
its deep-rooted inequality. While
inequality has decreased, it still
persists and affects local resources
and local governments’ capability to
implement policies, and thus, the
nation’s democracy.
In the last two years, Brazil has
40

seen two major waves of public
protest, both of which addressed
– albeit with different objectives
– the problem of inequality. Some
of the protesters’ demands have
already been granted. What happens
next remains to be seen, but these
developments raise hope that Brazil
could slowly be finding its way
toward a more equal society. Both
decentralizing and recentralizing
tendencies have played crucial roles
in this process.
Gretha Burchard is a PhD Candidate
in Public Administration at Florida
International University.
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Promises and Risks: Challenges to the
Decentralization Agenda in Chile
By José Inostroza Lara and Javier Fuenzalida Aguirre

Chile is experiencing a true civil revolution, with citizens demanding public policies that address income inequality and the quality of education.
Students and teachers march in the streets of Valparaiso, Chile during a protest to demand public education on May 14, 2015. For four years, Chilean
students have taken to the streets to demand high-quality, free public education and an end to the current system of private financing.
MARCELO BENITEZ/Latincontent/Getty Images.

C

hile has one of the most
successful records of
social, economic and
democratic development
in Latin America.
Over the last 25 years, the country
has implemented public policies that
expand coverage of basic services
and has maintained impeccable
and efficient fiscal discipline. The
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mortality index has been reduced
and poverty has decreased by 65%,
while life expectancy and the quality
and coverage of education have all
increased.
These improvements have
brought with them more
sophisticated and complex public
demands. Chile is experiencing
a true civil revolution, with

citizens calling for public policies
that address income inequality
and the quality of education.
Accompanying these demands
are calls for improved democracy
with increased public participation
in the decision-making process,
and greater recognition of and
respect for sexual and reproductive
rights. These demands, particularly
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those regarding democracy and
citizen participation, are linked to
the deficit in the distribution of
territorial power and authority. In
many circles, decentralization is
considered key to addressing these
problems.
For the last two decades, however,
Chile’s decentralization has been
insufficiently dynamic. A few
policies stand out – the creation of
municipalities (1989), the direct
election of mayors (1992), and laws
addressing local civil servant incomes
and local personnel management –
but on the whole, the decentralization
process can be characterized as a sum
of relatively isolated, formalistic and
low-impact initiatives.
The failed experience of
municipal administration of public
education serves as an important
example of a poorly designed and
implemented decentralization
policy. Advances in regionalization
have also been mediocre, despite
the 1992 creation of regional
councils (CORES) and regional
governments (GORES). The
current institutional framework
has not provided the GORES
with sufficient tools to lead and
coordinate the development of
public policies in their territory
and relegates their leadership to an
intendente, a representative of the
central government. In 2013, Chile
finally passed a reform providing
for democratic election of CORES
representatives.
Considering this modest
progress, a 2014 government
commission offered the following
recommendations: 1) the
democratic election of intendants;
2) greater involvement of
subnational governments in raising
revenues and determining expenses;

3) the transfer of functions to the
subnational level; 4) strengthening
of subnational management; and
5) greater citizen participation and
democratic control.
The imminent deepening of
decentralization policy has set off
alarms in political and technobureaucratic sectors, which warn
that the process will jeopardize the
efficiency and effectiveness of service
delivery and the country’s famed
fiscal stringency. Key questions
include: How to enjoy the benefits of
decentralization without threatening
the gains derived from the country’s
fiscal rigor? With political power
distributed geographically, how
can basic national standards in
the delivery of public services be
assured? And last, how can the
national goveernment guarantee the
efficient design and implementation
of public policies made at the local
level? To answer these questions, the
next section analyzes the country’s
proposed decentralization agenda, the
risks of inadequate implementation,
and possible safeguards against
potential problems.
The Presidential Commission
on Decentralization: proposals
and reality
The commission’s
recommendations are
multidimensional and address each
separate element of decentralization.
In the area of political
decentralization, the commission
recommends the democratic
election of intendants, who are
currently presidential appointees,
by 2016. In the administrative
sphere, it recommends transferring
management of several national
public services to the GORES,
with binding contracts to aid in

coordination between different levels
of government. In fiscal matters, the
presidential commission proposes
a significant increase in revenues
and autonomous spending for
GORES and municipalities. It also
proposes a new Regional Revenue
Act authorizing the GORES to
issue debt and borrow up to 7% of
their budget. The act would include
an investment fund for those
areas lagging in the administrative
decentralization process. To
strengthen local and regional
capacities, the commision suggests
incentives to attract more human
capital and speed development in
science and technology. Finally, with
regard to citizen participation and
democratic control, it proposes the
facilitation and creation of political
parties at the regional level.
Given the current state of public
discussion of these proposals,
political incentives at the national
level seem insufficient to implement
this agenda. When it comes to
decentralization, Chile has a long
tradition of incrementalism and
formalistic reforms that are more
symbolic than substantive. Any
effective action must include
both incentives and operational
mechanisms that will lessen the
fears of centralist sectors. Reformers,
therefore, should aim at an enabling
sequence that focuses on the longterm consolidation of reforms
based on the nation’s history of
incrementalism. A series of regional
political reforms is also needed to
facilitate these decentralization
efforts. To address these issues, we
recommend the following:
1. Subnational political leadership
to initiate regional democracy.
The first elected intendants
could coopt the regional
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bureaucracy to their individual
electoral interests. To do so,
they would have to compensate
the figures who pose the initial
challenge to elected authorities,
create effective social control
systems, and maintain national
controls on the performance
and integrity of regional
authorities.
2. Analysis of which services to
transfer gradually and which
should remain in the central
government’s domain. Lack of
experience, technical capacity
and other factors may result
in a relaxation of technical
standards as well as other
performance measurement
standards. Transferring services
will require a definition of
“national standards,” a topic
Chile has not developed
sufficiently to date.
3. A system to distinguish
between types of subnational
spending: a) ongoing
expenditures less prone to
changes in national fiscal
policy (fixed financing); and
b) financing for projects or
utilities subject to changes
in national macrofiscal
policy (flexible and dynamic
financing). The Chilean
government has an effective
and well-designed system
for managing the rate and
direction of spending. The
Budget Directive (DIPRES)
has particularly effective
staff and is built on a strong
foundation of human capital.
Increasing autonomy in
spending and income at
the subnational levels could
generate a deficit in this
capacity and an eventual loss of
44

4.

5.

6.

7.

fiscal efficiency. Distinguishing
between spending types
is especially important
considering that few regions
in Chile are financially selfsufficient, making national
financial support mechanisms
necessary for the long-term.
Professional and transparent
mechanisms to recruit, select,
retain, train and evaluate
public personnel. Chile does
not have an effective civil
service system for subnational
government officials. Such a
system should be a requirement
for the delivery of more
resources and authority from
the central to the subnational
governments.
Enhanced post-performance
evaluation of subnational
decisions, with the possible
creation of a new agency to
evaluate public policies.
Voluntary associations between
GORES and municipalities
for some specific services.
Chile already has initiatives
along this line, including the
aggregation of demands for
the purchase of medicines and
shared software repositories.
Chile has a relatively small
population and a great deal
of land, making it likely that
national economies of scale
will be lost at the subnational
level. Collaboration between
regional governments and
municipalities could mitigate
this problem.
Effective compensatory
programs to support regional
capabilities and ensure greater
equity among subnational
units. The development gap
between regions poses a major

threat to decentralization
efforts in Chile, with many
measures that promote greater
revenue generation – and
autonomy at the regional level
– favoring those regions with
mining potential.
Conclusion
Moving forward with
decentralization is critical to Chile’s
future development. One of the
principles that should govern the
design of decentralization policy
is the development of regional
capacity for resource generation
and control, and compliance with
national standards. Developing
this capacity should be viewed
not as a barrier to the dynamism
of the country’s decentralization
process, but rather as a way
to contribute to greater depth
and sustainability in policy.
Subnational governments need to
learn to drive their development
with greater autonomy, with the
national government exercising
its irreplaceable capacity to ensure
a global outlook. A balanced and
sophisticated design will ensure a
positive outlook for the future.
José Inostroza Lara is a parttime professor in the Department
of Industrial Engineering at the
University of Chile and Director of
the IDB/Chilean Ministry of Finance
State Modernization Program.
Javier Fuenzalida Aguirre is a
researcher at the Center for Public
Systems in the Industrial Engineering
Department at the University of
Chile and a PhD student in Rutgers
University’s School of Public Affairs
and Administration.

Hemisphere Volume 24

14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd 44

7/21/15 3:35 PM

Country Reports

Hemisphere Volume 24

14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd 45

45

7/21/15 3:35 PM

L o o ki n g

F o r wa r d

Decentralization and
Recentralization in Latin America
By Daniel Cravacuore

L

atin America is currently
experiencing a “recentralization” cycle,
reversing the municipal
empowerment trend of
the last three decades. Following
Cohen and Peterson, countries
explore and experience various
forms of decentralization: spatial,
market-oriented, political and
administrative. The first limits the
concentration of development in
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a few territorial enclaves, while
the second encourages the transfer
of services traditionally provided
by the state to the private sector.
Political decentralization proposes
a redistribution of power and
a new democratic legitimacy
in favor of local communities.
Administrative decentralization
implies the devolution of resources
and decision-making capacity to
territorial governments, enabling

them to provide public and social
services and carry out public works.
Decentralization in Latin
America traditionally involves
the political and administrative
dimensions of the process. A
quarter-century ago, it was a major
topic on the regional agenda, not
only at all levels of government,
but also at academic institutions,
international agencies, political
parties on both the left and right,
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and civil society organizations,
in countries large and small. The
concept has manifested itself
in constitutional and legislative
reforms that promote the popular
election of local authorities and the
transfer of skills and resources to
strengthen municipal autonomy.
A brief history of decentralization
Latin America’s decentralization
process was initiated in 1980 with
the direct election of mayors and
councilors in Peru, followed by the
first direct elections for mayors and
local parliamentarians in Colombia
(1986), Bolivia (1987) and Ecuador
(1988). By the end of the decade,
many Latin American local
authorities were being elected by
universal suffrage. It was a time of
democratic normalization, of trust
in institutions and belief in civic
participation. In just over a decade,
countries across the region regained
full democracy: Ecuador (1979),
Peru (1980), Honduras (1982),
Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), El
Salvador (1984), Nicaragua (1984),
Uruguay (1984), Brazil (1985),
Guatemala (1986), Panama (1989),
Paraguay (1989) and Chile (1990).
A second wave of decentralization
followed in countries including El
Salvador (1999), Guatemala (2002),
Panama (2004) and Dominican
Republic (2003).
In 1979, the Chilean government
promoted the decentralization
of health policy and, two years
later, education services, serving
as the immediate predecessor for
other countries that initiated the
transfer of various competencies.
These reforms responded to
the subsidiarity principle – a
fundamental tenet of the European
Union designed to ensure that

power is exercised as close to
the citizen as possible – and
the assumption that service
delivery at the local level was
more effective and efficient. This
involved creating new mechanisms
for intergovernmental transfers
in favor of the municipal and
subnational levels. In short,
decentralization found its
momentum in the strengthening
of emerging democracies through
citizen participation and finding
innovative ways to solve part of the
state crisis.
Thirty years of decentralization
efforts allow us to take stock of
the movement’s achievements. The
inclusion of municipal concerns in
the public agenda transformed local
governments in terms of policy
implementation and innovation,
leadership building and electoral
competition. Municipalities became
the arenas of public debate and
the intersection of civic and public
policy demands that pushed for
open and democratic governments.
The gains have been significant,
but the process of decentralization
is still unfinished. Not all of the
desired results have been achieved:
Some reforms were never deployed,
and the policy’s political appeal
was based more on symbolism or
international pressure than a firm
belief in its advantages.
Four debates have emerged from
this perceived failure. Unitary
countries argue over the degree
of empowerment of intermediate
levels of government, while socialist
countries debate radical change
with an underlying desire to build
new state organizations. A third
debate is the fate of territorial
royalties for the exploitation of
natural resources, with proposed

limits on or suppression of local
capacity. Finally, a fourth debate
involves the reduction of regular
resources for municipalities
and their replacement with
discretionary transfers from the
state or state enterprises in an
effort to limit local autonomy
to determine priorities and
allocate resources.
Recentralization in Latin America
Recent research suggests that,
beyond national nuances, the
region is witnessing the beginnings
of a reversal of administrative
decentralization and its consequent
impact on policy. Uruguay’s 2010
law of municipal decentralization
and citizen participation, which
created a third level of government
below the department level, was the
last reformist law passed in Latin
America. In unitary countries,
decentralization efforts seem to
have shifted to a parsimonious
process not without doubts
and setbacks. In larger federal
countries, the process appears to
have stopped without any real
prospects for transformation. In
this context, some critics propose
recovering the powers transferred,
and international organizations,
political parties, and municipal
organizations are abandoning
their efforts to encourage
decentralization. Municipalities are
experiencing a crisis characterized
by low-level local participation,
conflicts with national governments
(often followed by cooptation), and
a lack of unity.
The reduction of regular budget
transfers to local governments is
well-known: Growing national
budgets (driven by raw material
exports) provide national
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governments with more funds to
transfer extraordinary resources
and use them politically to
discipline mayors who fall out
of line. Moreover, concrete
limitations have been placed on
citizen participation, the very
notion of which clashes with the
historical political practices and
authoritarian behavior of many
political leaders in the region.
Recentralization has found few
major obstacles to limiting political
decentralization and, with it,
local democracy, by imposing
restrictions on routine electoral
processes. Two broad ideological
positions sustain this process: a
drive toward state recentralization,
and an emphasis on the fiscal costs
of decentralization. Ironically, the
same neo-liberal and progressive
sectors that favored decentralization
in the 1980s and 1990s support
recentralization today.
The starting point of this trend
was a ruling of the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court
of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela in 2001 declaring
that national legislation takes
precedence over state law in
regulating municipal organization.
Until then, the government
of Hugo Chávez had held out
some promise of decentralization
(including an acknowledgement
in the 1999 Constitution that
“Decentralization, as national
policy, should strengthen
democracy, bring power to the
people and create optimum
conditions for both the exercise of
democracy and the effective and
efficient delivery of government
commitments”), but it soon
shifted to regular subjugation
of local autonomy. This process
48

has occurred in a context of
false consensus concerning
the importance of municipal
government. The most relevant
public actors (e.g. political leaders,
entrepreneurs, academics) do not
hesitate to laud local governments’
role in development, but they are
notably silent when the transfer of
obligations or resources is involved.
The problem is compounded by
the habitual failure of community
leaders (mayors, councilors, and
representatives of municipal
associations) to confront regional
restrictions. This may be a result
of the fact that local government
office often is only a steppingstone
on the path to national political
ambitions.
Possible consequences of
recentralization
This article has focused on the
emergence of a centralization cycle
in Latin America that reverses the
municipal empowerment of the last
three decades. Originating early
in the century, recentralization
seems to have become a trend that
transcends ideological differences.
It is manifested most drastically
among socialist governments,
which seek to subordinate local
authorities with hierarchical
logic and limit the expression of
democratic opposition. Other
governments, while respectful
of the popular will, justify
recentralization by citing the
alleged inefficiency and corruption
of local governments (as if this
phenomenon were limited only to
the local level). A more elaborate
argument points to the need for
territorial equity and uniform
protection of rights.
Recentralization does not mean

returning to the political realities of
three decades ago. The dimension
most affected is likely to be
administrative, but discretionary
cuts in budgetary transfers will
also have an impact on the
political sphere, limiting the role
of local leaders, such as mayors, by
transforming them into mere agents
of the central government’s will. In
most cases, citizen participation is
still too weak to provide an effective
counterweight and collides with
traditional authoritarian political
practices and behaviors. Moreover,
as already noted, mayors and
municipal organizations themselves
seem little inclined to confront or
fight regional restrictions. Taken
together, these developments raise
doubts about the future of local
democracy in Latin America.
Daniel Cravacuore is Director of the
Division of Local Government in
the Department of Economics and
Management at the National University
of Quilmes; a researcher at the Center for
Urban Studies and Research in Social
Policy at the National University of Tres
de Febrero; Director of the Argentine
headquarters of the American Institute
for Urban Research and Regional
Studies of the Ibero-American Union of
Municipalities; and Editor of the IberoAmerican Journal of Municipal Studies.
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